Resumo O artigo tem como objetivo explorar as posições políticas, partidárias e ideológicas que PSDB, PT e MDB atribuíram à proposta de política externa em seus programas eleitorais entre 1994 e 2018. A hipótese é que, contrariando a literatura, a política externa é utilizada como meio de diferenciação ideológica na campanha eleitoral. Para analisar os programas partidários foi adaptado o método elaborado pelo Manifesto Research Group, que possibilita a codificação de unidades textuais em valores numéricos numa escala ideológica esquerda-direita. Os resultados indicam que a política externa eleitoral do PSDB é inclinada à centro-direita, a do PT é consolidada à esquerda e a do MDB se comporta como o esperado de uma política pública de um partido centrista. Portanto, as conclusões apontam que, de fato, a política externa, como as demais políticas públicas, sofre diferenciação eleitoral através de posicionamentos políticos e ideológicos vinculados ao partido de origem.

Abstract The article aims to explore the political, partisan and ideological positions that PSDB, PT and MDB have attributed to their foreign policy propositions in their electoral manifestos between 1994 and 2018. The hypothesis is that, contrary to the literature, foreign policy is used as means of ideological differentiation in electoral campaigns. In order to analyze the party programs, the Manifesto Research Group method, which allows the codification of textual units in numerical values on a left-right ideological scale, was adapted. The results indicate that, despite few ideological variations, the PSDB’s electoral foreign policy is center-right inclined, the PT’s is consolidated on the left and the MDB’s behaves as one would expect for a public policy from a centrist party. Therefore, the conclusions indicate that, like other public policies, foreign policy indeed undergoes electoral differentiation as a result of the political and ideological positions tied to their home party.

The use of social media has become increasingly widespread among citizens and politicians in Brazil. This means of communication served as a key arena for debate and propaganda during the 2014 legislative and presidential elections, when a very polarized political scenario emerged. New approaches have been developed that use information from the social network structure constructed by political actors on social media platforms, such as Twitter, in order to calculate ideal points. Can data from the decision to 'follow' a profile on Twitter be used to estimate politicians' ideological positions? Can approaches like this show the variance of political positions even within a very fragmented legislative body, such as the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies? This article presents and analyzes the successful application of a Bayesian spatial model developed by Barberá (2015), using data from Brazil. This method allowed to capture differences between parties and political actors similar to those found by means of roll call votes. It also makes possible to calculate ideal points for actors who participate in the public debate, but are not professional politicians.

Este artigo analisa o uso de candidaturas para cargos mais altos, não só como evidência de ambição progressiva, mas também como fonte de benefícios eleitorais para o candidato. O argumento é que eleições alternadas para cargos nos diferentes níveis no sistema federativo permitem que até mesmo candidatos que perderam disputas por prefeituras tirem proveito da cobertura da campanha mais tarde na corrida por uma vaga na Câmara dos Deputados. A hipótese de que esse retorno eleitoral existe é testada por meio de modelos lineares e de máxima verossimilhança, usando dados das eleições para deputado federal em 2010, tendo em conta o desempenho dos candidatos em 2006 e se eles concorreram ou não para prefeito em 2008. Os resultados mostram que há ??benefícios eleitorais consideráveis para o candidato, mesmo para aqueles que perderam eleições para prefeito.

This article analyzes the use of candidacies for higher political offices, not only as evidence of progressive ambition, but also as a source of electoral benefits for the candidate. The argument is that alternating elections for different level positions in the federative system permit that even candidates who lost in mayoral races to take advantage of campaign coverage later in the race for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The hypothesis that this electoral return exists is tested by applying linear and maximum likelihood models on data from Brazilian federal deputy elections in 2010, taking into account their performance in 2006 and whether or not they ran for mayor in 2008. Results show that there are considerable late electoral benefits even for those who lost mayoral elections.